Introduction
Immigration and immigration policy have always been a salient issue in the U.S. policy debate (Hatton and Williamson 2005) . The paper is divided into two major parts. The first part illustrates a general review of the existing literature on immigration federalism, and identifies the conventional factors labeled as the triggering variables on sub-federal activism for immigration reform. In doing so, this paper employs a statistical analysis of the identified factors as means to verify and test the validity of the factors. As it will be addressed later, the empirical analysis suggests that the combination of poor economic conditions and partisanship characteristics are statistically significant drivers of a sub-federal activism for immigration reform.
In the second part, this paper triangulates the findings from the empirical analysis to the specific case of Arizona and finds that the statistical significance of designated factors have little explanatory power in supporting why and how specific state governments are triggered to challenge the federal exclusivity. In that note, this paper turns its attention to explaining the process of how Arizona's omnibus immigration law, SB 1070, came to be enacted by tracing the spread of anti-immigrant sentiment in the state of Arizona. This research ultimately suggests that Arizona's omnibus immigration law is a product of interaction among many different factors, and that regardless of how the bill came into being, it served as an important wake-up-call for the federal government to tackle the matter on immigration at the national level.
The scholarship in immigration federalism is in the process of evolving, thus making it difficult to come to an abrupt conclusion with the implications generated with its basis in the findings and the methods from the existing literature. Ultimately, by employing the mixed methods in this research, combining the benefits of systematic analysis through the empirical study with the benefits of a detailed oriented case study of Arizona, this research offers a degree of foresight towards which direction of American immigration policy legislation is headed at the subfederal levels. In detail, there are three major contributions that this research can make to the evolving scholarship. First, this research data can be used as a reference point for the current position and status of how far the scholarship on immigration federalism has evolved. Second, this research can serve as a useful tool in verifying previous studies and their results. By conducting this research with analogous fields of data from the previous literature, the findings from this research can serve as a handy verification to the former studies with verifiable methods that can be repeated. Lastly, this research can shed light on which factors have been overlooked and explore new, yet significant, independent variables in order to find the root cause of why some sub-federal units of governments challenge the federal exclusivity on immigration policymaking. In all, as a part of the burgeoning academic corpus on immigration federalism, this research is a pivotal work in progress -a necessary step in diagnosing how well the American democracy and federalism has evolved in the control and treatment of immigrants in the US through its policies, not just from the limited perspective of the federal government, but rather from the sub-federal levels.
"The Knows and How's": Triggering Variables of Immigration Federalism (1) Literature Review
Discussion on the role of states and localities in immigration-related policymaking is most active in legal scholarship. While the legal scholarship is distant from seeking clues as to why and how immigration federalism installs or proliferates, it does highlight the constitutionality and practicality of immigration federalism. Largely, it is divided into two camps, one that argues for, and the other arguing against immigration federalism. The pro-immigration federalism camp argues that state regulations, such as the Arizona's SB 1070 were products of the mirror-image theory, 1) which is ultimately inconsistent with the federal government's immigration jurisprudences, laws, and policies (Chin) . Scholars who side within this perspective agree that 1) The 'mirror image theory' is a technical legal concept that champions the idea that states can draft, pass, and enact immigration laws based on federal standards. This theory proposes the idea that sub-federal polities, especially the states, can help execute federal policies by enacting and enforcing state laws that "mirrors" federal statutes and standards.
states can enact and enforce state regulation of immigrants, not immigration control.
Proponents of 'immigration federalism' argue not only that the increased state and local involvement in immigration enhances the robustness of cooperative federalism in the US, but also that the federal government cannot preempt the shared power of immigration. 2) More specifically, they argue that despite the federal exclusivity in immigration policymaking, the federal government must acknowledge that the states are a "de facto multi-sovereign regime," and that there is a "structural need for federal, state, and local participation in immigration regulation [and immigration integration;]" ultimately concluding that allowing --federal governments to legislate independent immigration policies will not necessarily be hostile to immigrants (Clare Huntington 823).
The opposing camp sees immigration federalism through a more gloomy and negative lens. For instance, they express concerns over the negative consequences of the full devolution of the immigration regime and the potential for uncontrollable proliferation of sub-federal activism in immigration policymaking. In the social sciences, the issue was addressed in a much more systematic way than the legal scholars and far from discussing only in terms of constitutionality and practicality of immigration federalism. Survival Analysis, Duration Analysis, Failure Time Analysis, and Hazard Analysis. In mathematical terms, this analysis is used when the social process is concerned with change in y(t). For example, "transitions across labor market status, from unemployed to employment," "transition out of marriage to divorce/separation," "transition from poverty to financial security," "recidivism, what factors predict further criminality?," etc. Considering that Arizona shares the longest border with Mexico than any other Southern Border States, it is likely that Mexican immigrants, both legally and illegally would make Arizona their first stop in the US. In fact, according to the US Census data, the total non-white population of Arizona accounted for nearly 45% of its total population in 2011. In detail, the non-white persons in Arizona in 2011 were 2.8 million persons out of 6.5 million total populations.
Of the 2.8 million, more than 2 million people were of Hispanic the unemployment rate and the per capita GDP of the state was at its lowest ever. 14) However, such trend in the economic downfall was 
(2) Spread of Anti-Immigration Sentiment in Arizona Localities
Though it is true that the Arizona state legislatures tends to be (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/06/joe-arpaio-immigrant-raids_n_6424782.html) 29) In this research, "approval ratings" refer to the job performance points that the voters rated the candidate on. Generally, approval ratings were collected from the surveys that contained questions that asked the surveyors to rate the subjects' job performances on a 5-level-scale from very poor to excellent/good. Popularity ratings were collected from the surveys that contained questions that asked the surveyors' support for a hypothetical governor's race, such as, "if so-and-so was running for governor/party primary, who would you vote for?" Arpaio's popularity ratings show the percentage of voters' who is likely to vote for Arpaio in a potential election for a public office.
30) BRC produces nationally respected and recognized Rocky Mountain Poll and
Consumer Confidence Index, etc., which tracks public opinion data in Arizona. Arpaio, on average, stayed in the above 50% range for his job approval ratings throughout the 10 years in which the ratings were collected. His popularity ratings showed similar patterns, though it had a slower climbing rate in the early 2000s. All of the recorded popularity ratings of Arpaio were survey results of voters who placed him as the most favorable candidate to vote for either a hypothetical governor race for Arizona or the Republican Party primary race.
Voters not only found Arpaio more favorable than the other innerparty competitors, but also, they were more likely to vote for Arpaio among all candidates in the race, regardless of party allegiance.
Clearly, Arpaio was a favorable and popular person to the majority of the voters in Arizona.
Joe Arpaio experienced a parallel growth of both approval and disapproval rating since he began the illegal immigration raids. Clearly, the public's opinion on illegal immigration is divided on the issue of local law enforcement and general negative perception on them; that is, the majority of the public seems to support local law enforcement of immigration laws which would penalize illegal immigration, while not necessarily perceiving illegal immigrants as potential threats or negative influence over them. It is difficult to determine which factor had initiated an antiimmigration sentiment in Arizona, but it is easy to spot when and how such sentiment had proliferated in Arizona. The existence of a local politician in the center of the buildup for anti-immigration sentiment goes to show that sub-federal challenge on federal exclusivity on immigration regulation is a product of unpredictable, various states. State funds should be used for such things as education, transportation and job development." 32) Surveyors were asked to rate on the statements of, "immigration law should find a way for immigrant workers to come and go without breaking US laws," and "in general, do you favor or do you oppose requiring local police in addition to their regular duties, to enforce immigration laws by requiring officers to verify the nationality of anyone they stop in the course of their regular law enforcement duties?" 33) Surveyors were asked to either favor or oppose the governor signing the SB 1070 law. 34) Surveyors were asked to either favor or oppose creating an opportunity for illegal immigrants to stay in the US and apply for citizenship.
sporadic political theater borne out of local politics, not necessarily from national politics in Washington DC.
Conclusion
As the Arizona case showed, none of the factors identified from the pilot test and the existing literature concerning the state's economy, demography, and safety showed to have had a significant degree of influence over the state in enacting SB 1070. This research demonstrated that the political factor is a complicated matter that goes beyond the existing literature's discussion of which party tends to support immigration or not; political factor is seldom party politics alone, rather it is an amalgamation of state's economic, demographic, and social issues. Further, it showed that the issues surrounding immigration is not only a statewide matter, but also a very local matter at the municipal, and county level. Just as public opinion on a particular politician may form, sentiments regarding immigration may form with either negative or positive nuance, ultimately spreading to diverse corners of society.
In terms of economy, while it is undeniable that Arizona is an exceptional state that challenged the federal exclusivity when the unemployment was at its peak, and when the GDP per capita experienced negative growth, it is difficult to determine that the economic factor significantly triggered the sub-federal enactment of the omnibus immigration law. This in-depth analysis demonstrated that while it is true that the racial mix up of the American population will rise naturally, the data, both at the surface level and in deeper level, suggests that the demographic change is natural, and has no direct correlations to explaining why and when the states challenge the federal exclusivity. 
